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Dieter Helm and Najma Rajah let off a number of big guns, not all pointing in
the same direction. May I take up three points in reply?
I. INVESTMENT
There is a whiff of ‘investment is a good thing’ in the article. Those who pay the
bills to finance it may expect it to be appraised in respect of both costs and
benefits. I took this up with Lord Crickhowell, Chairman of the National Rivers
Authority (NRA), back in 1989 when we were first appointed. We now agree
that this is the right approach. OFWAT has contributed by estimating the
consequences of investment for customers’ bills and in encouraging water
companies to research the views of their customers. I know the NRA is working
on the assessment of environmental benefits.
Meanwhile customers’ bills continue to rise. Thirty per cent of the 15,000
complaints a year received by OFWAT are about the level of or, more often, the
increase in bills. I have statutory duties to protect the interests of customers and
in pursuit of this need to ensure that investment in a monopoly sector — either to
improve the environment or to sustain the serviceability of water company assets
— is fully justified. I am not convinced that this is always the case. Some of the
standards set on quality grounds are extremely stringent and it is not obvious that
all customers want to pay for them.
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II. LINKS BETWEEN REGULATORS
I agree that initially insufficient attention was paid to relations between water
regulators (OFWAT, the NRA and the Drinking Water Inspectorate). We have
been remedying this under the aegis of the Department of the Environment:
water quality (of drinking water and waste water) is a matter to be settled by
Ministers either with their colleagues in Brussels or at a national level. It is not a
matter that can — or ought to — be decided by regulators, either economic
regulators or quality regulators, or some combination of both. The important
constitutional implication is that there should be close links between regulators
and the political arm of government — relations that respect both national
objectives as decided by the Government of the day and the independence of
regulators to act under the law.
The quadripartite meetings are one example of how this machinery is
evolving.
III. INTERVENTION
Helm and Rajah are ambivalent. Initially they are critical and then they call for
more intervention to achieve the flexibility they seek. I have tried to be
innovative while respecting my statutory duties.
In 1989 the water companies persuaded the Government to insert a clause in
the Licence, allowing for adjustment of price limits should construction prices
rise by more than was forecast. Government ensured that the facility was
reciprocal. No one should have been surprised that OFWAT should adjust price
limits downwards when construction prices rose by less than was forecast. This
happened in 1991 and 1992. The first adjustment was voluntary (rather like an
out-of-court settlement). The second was via formal process; I responded to
criticisms that I had been insufficiently transparent in 1991. There were no
adjustments in 1990 nor in 1993.
I have subsequently suggested to those companies that wish to do so that their
Licences should be changed to delete this provision. Twenty-six have agreed to
delete it; four would prefer to retain it. So we will be able to see which set of
arrangements seem to work best.
I decided to have a Periodic Review in 1994 rather than let things run until
1999 because I believed that, in its absence, companies would follow South West
Water by putting in applications for increases in price limits to finance the large
investment necessary to implement the Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive.
This Directive was agreed by the UK after price limits were set in 1989. The
mechanism for Interim Determinations between price reviews (rightly) restricts
the matters that can be taken into account. For example, efficiency is excluded.
Given the scale of the investment involved — around £10 billion, much of it
over five years — it seemed to me essential to look at the whole financialWater Regulation — A Response
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position of the water companies and not simply to add further price increases to
those set in 1989.
Having made these points, I welcome this article and would like to encourage
the authors to work up their suggestions for improvement. No regime can be
perfect at its inception. As Arthur Young said of the Revolutionaries in 1789, ‘A
constitution is not like a pudding to be made out of a recipe’. As Michael
Oakeshott puts it, we need, from time to time, to ‘attend to the general
arrangements of a set of people whom chance or choice have brought together’.